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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Garrett McCoy was convicted of grand theft by possession of stolen property following a
jury trial, and was sentenced as a persistent violator to a unified term of fourteen years, with four
years fixed.

He appeals from his judgment of conviction, raising one issue on appeal.

Mr. McCoy contends he was denied his constitutional right to due process because of a fatal
variance between the charging document and the jury instructions, which requires reversal of his
conviction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In November 2016, a high school junior living with his family in Nampa, Idaho (Canyon
County), started his parents’ white pickup truck and left it running in the driveway while he got
ready for school. (Tr., p.180, L.9 – p.183, L.3, p.184, Ls.6-11.) When he was ready for school,
the boy went outside and the truck was gone. (Tr., p.185, Ls.2-12.) He called the Nampa Police
Department to report the crime. (Tr., p.186, Ls.23-25, p.188, Ls.1-5.)
Later that same day, a public safety aide for Garden City, Idaho (Ada County) saw a
white pickup truck parked in a vacant lot that is frequently used for dumping vehicles.
(Tr., p.221, Ls.17-19, p.228, L.15 – p.229, L.2, p.231, Ls.8-14.) He ran the VIN number on the
truck, and the vehicle returned as stolen. (Tr., p.229, Ls.9-12.) He contacted Officer Otter, who
responded to the scene. (Tr., p.233, Ls.4-9, p.244, Ls.6-21.) Officer Otter confirmed the truck
was stolen out of Nampa. (Tr., p.245, L.19 – p.246, L.3.) At that point, Mr. McCoy walked
towards the vehicle, and asked the officer if he had found the keys to his vehicle, pointing to the
truck.

(Tr., p.248, Ls.20-24, p.250, Ls.2-5.)

borrowed the truck.

Upon questioning, Mr. McCoy said he had

(Tr., p.250, Ls.6-11.)

After another officer arrived, Officer Otter
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handcuffed Mr. McCoy and advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). (Tr., p.252, L.24 – p.253, L.4.) Mr. McCoy continued to talk to Officer Otter, and
ultimately admitted he had taken the truck because “[h]e was drawn to it.” (Tr., p.254, L.24 –
p.255, L.18; State’s Ex. 3.)
Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. McCoy was charged by Information with one count
of grand theft by possession of stolen property in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(4), 2409.
(R., pp.22, 26-27.) The State alleged Mr. McCoy, in Ada County:
[D]id knowingly possess stolen property, to-wit: a 2014 Honda Ridgeline of a
value in excess of One Thousand Dollars . . . knowing the property to have been
stolen, or under circumstances as would reasonably induce him/her to believe that
the property was stolen, and with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of
the use or benefit of the property.
(R., pp.26-27.) The State subsequently filed an Information Part II alleging Mr. McCoy was a
persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.73-74.)
Both parties submitted proposed jury instructions to the district court in advance of trial.
(R., pp.86-88, 95-96.) The State requested eight jury instructions, including an instruction on
Theft Different Forms Possible. (R., pp.86-88.) The State provided the following proposed
language for its requested instruction on Theft Different Forms Possible:
There are different forms of Grand Theft, depending on the manner in which the
theft was committed. The defendant, Garrett C. McCoy, is charged in Count I with
the theft of a white 2014 Honda Ridgeline. The state alleges that such theft was
committed either by wrongfully taking the property or by knowingly possessing the
stolen property. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously
agree that the defendant committed the crime of Grand Theft, you should find the
defendant guilty. You are not required to agree as to which particular form of theft
the defendant committed.
(R., p.87.) Mr. McCoy requested one instruction, ICJI 561, on Driving a Vehicle Without the
Owner’s Consent. (R., pp.95-96.)
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On the first day of trial, the district court granted the State’s motion, over Mr. McCoy’s
objection, to amend the Information to include references to Idaho Code §§ 18-2407(1)(b) and
19-309.

(Tr., p.7, L.10 – p.13, L.6.)

The Information was subsequently amended by

interlineation. (R., pp.100-01.) The Amended Information did not remove the reference to the
alleged crime being committed in Ada County, did not change the crime alleged from grand theft
by possession of stolen property to grand theft, and did not refer to Idaho Code § 18-2403(1),
which states that “[a] person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully
takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” (R., pp.100-01.)
The jury was given the following instruction, which was almost the exactly the same as
the instruction proposed by the State:
Instruction No. 12—There are different forms of Grand Theft depending upon the
manner in which the theft was committed. The defendant, GARRETT M.
MCCOY, is charged in Count I with the theft of a 2014 Honda Ridgeline. The
State alleges that such theft was committed either by wrongfully taking the
property, as described in Instruction No. 13, or by knowingly possessing the
stolen property, as described in Instruction No. 14. If you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant committed the crime
of Grand Theft, you should find the defendant guilty. You are not required to
agree as to which particular form of theft the defendant committed.
(R., p.128.) The jury was instructed on the elements of Grand Theft, in Instruction No. 13, and
the elements of Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property, in Instruction No. 14.
(R., pp.129-31.) Counsel for Mr. McCoy objected to Instruction No. 14, arguing it was not
supported by the evidence and could be confusing to the jury. (Tr., p.287, Ls.3-18.) The district
court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.288, L.18 – p.289, L.5.)
The verdict form asked the jury to determine whether Mr. McCoy was “not guilty or
guilty of GRAND THEFT BY POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPETY as charged in Count I of
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the Information.” (R., p.145.) The disputed issue at trial concerned Mr. McCoy’s intent;
specifically, whether he had the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the truck or to
appropriate the truck for himself either at the time of, or subsequent to, the taking. (Tr., p.310,
Ls.4-7.) The jury found Mr. McCoy guilty and thus did not reach a verdict on the lesser included
offense of driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent. (R., pp.145-46.) Mr. McCoy then pled
guilty to being a persistent violator. (Tr., p.349, L.25 – p.351, L.8.)
The district court sentenced Mr. McCoy to a unified term of fourteen years, with four
years fixed. (Tr., p.376, Ls.14-18.) The judgment of conviction was entered on April 12, 2018,
and Mr. McCoy filed a timely notice of appeal on April 19, 2018. (R., pp.173-81.) The district
court subsequently denied Mr. McCoy’s motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) for credit
for time served, and his motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) for a reduction of
sentence. (R., pp.196-99.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court’s instruction to the jury that it could find Mr. McCoy guilty of grand theft if
the State proved he either wrongfully took property or knowingly possessed stolen property
create a fatal variance with the charging document, which specifically charged only the latter
offense?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court’s Instruction To The Jury That It Could Find Mr. McCoy Guilty Of Grand
Theft If The State Proved He Either Wrongfully Took Property Or Knowingly Possessed Stolen
Property Created A Fatal Variance With The Charging Document, Which Specifically Charged
Only The Latter Offense

A.

Introduction
The district court’s instruction to the jury that it could find Mr. McCoy guilty of grand

theft if the State proved he either wrongfully took property or knowingly possessed stolen
property created a fatal variance, as the Information charged Mr. McCoy only with committing
grand theft by knowingly possessing stolen property, and did not fairly inform Mr. McCoy he
would need to defend at trial against a charge of grand theft by wrongful taking. The variance
constituted fundamental error as it violated Mr. McCoy’s unwaived constitutional right to due
process, plainly exists, and was not harmless. Mr. McCoy’s conviction must be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which we exercise

free review.” State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 495 (Ct. App. 2011). If a variance exists, the Court
must decide whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction.
State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2001). Because Mr. McCoy raises this issue for the
first time on appeal, he must demonstrate fundamental error in order to get relief. See State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472-73 (2012). In order to establish fundamental error, Mr. McCoy
must show: “(1) the alleged error violated an unwaived constitutional right; (2) the alleged error
plainly exists; and (3) the alleged error was not harmless.” Id. at 473 (citing State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 228 (2010)).
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C.

The District Court’s Instruction To The Jury Created A Variance As The Information
Charged Mr. McCoy Only With Committing Grand Theft By Knowingly Possessing
Stolen Property
“A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case

before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010). A
variance may occur where there is a difference between the allegations in the charging document
and the jury instructions. State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004). A variance
exists in this case between the Information (originally and as amended) and the jury instructions.
Mr. McCoy was originally charged by Information with grand theft by possession of stolen
property in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(4), 2409. (R., pp.22, 26-27.) The State alleged
Mr. McCoy, in Ada County, “did knowingly possess stolen property . . . knowing the property to
have been stolen, or under circumstances as would reasonably induce him/her to believe that the
property was stolen, and with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of
the property.” (R., pp.26-27.)
On the first day of trial, the district court granted the State’s motion, over objection, to
amend the Information to include references to Idaho Code § 18-2407(1)(b) (stating a person is
guilty of grand theft when the value of the property taken exceeds $1,000) and Idaho Code § 19309 (stating that, when stolen property is carried from one county to another, the venue of the
offense is in either county). (Tr., p.7, L.10 – p.13, L.6.) The Amended Information did not
remove the reference to the alleged crime being committed in Ada County, did not change the
crime alleged from grand theft by possession of stolen property to just grand theft, and did not
refer to Idaho Code § 18-2403(1), which states that “[a] person steals property and commits theft
when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a
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third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.”
(R., pp.100-01.)
A variance was created when the district court gave the following instruction to the jury,
which was almost exactly the same as the instruction proposed by the State:
Instruction No. 12—There are different forms of Grand Theft depending upon the
manner in which the theft was committed. The defendant, GARRETT M.
MCCOY, is charged in Count I with the theft of a 2014 Honda Ridgeline. The
State alleges that such theft was committed either by wrongfully taking the
property, as described in Instruction No. 13, or by knowingly possessing the
stolen property, as described in Instruction No. 14. If you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant committed the crime
of Grand Theft, you should find the defendant guilty. You are not required to
agree as to which particular form of theft the defendant committed.
(R., pp.87, 128.) The jury was instructed on the elements of Grand Theft, in Instruction No. 13,
and the elements of Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property, in Instruction No. 14.
(R., pp.129-31.) The verdict form asked the jury to determine whether Mr. McCoy was “not
guilty or guilty of GRAND THEFT BY POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPETY as charged in
Count I of the Information.”

(R., p.145.)

The district court created a variance because

Mr. McCoy was never charged with grand theft by wrongful taking in Canyon County, and the
jury should not have been allowed to find Mr. McCoy guilty of grand theft under this theory.

D.

The Variance Was Fatal As The Information Did Not Fairly Inform Mr. McCoy That He
Would Need To Defend At Trial Against A Charge Of Grand Theft By Wrongful Taking
After determining that a variance exists, this Court must determine whether the variance

is fatal, which depends on “whether the basic functions of the pleading requirement have been
met.” Grove, 151 Idaho at 496. “A charging instrument meets the basic functions of the
pleading requirement if it fairly informs the defendant of the charges against which he or she
must defend and enables him or her to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
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prosecutions for the same offense.” Id. A variance is fatal if, among other things, it deprives the
defendant of his right to fair notice of the charge against which he must defend. State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18 (1985); Brazil, 136 Idaho at 329-30.
The variance in this case was fatal because the charging document did not fairly notify
Mr. McCoy that he would need to defend at trial against a charge of grand theft by wrongful
taking. The Information (originally and as amended) fairly informed Mr. McCoy that he would
need to defend at trial against the charge of grand theft by possession of stolen property in Ada
County. The district court’s instructions allowed the jury to convict Mr. McCoy if they found
him guilty of grand theft by wrongful taking in Canyon County. This is a crime of a different
nature. Mr. McCoy recognizes that, under Idaho Code § 18-2409(1), the charging document did
not need to allege the particular manner in which the property was stolen, or the particular theory
of theft involved. See State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 412 (Ct. App. 1987) (grand theft is a
specific intent crime and, although the crime may be committed in several ways, it generally
does not need to be pled in a particular way). However, he contends that where, as here, the
State chooses to include such specificity in the charging document, a variance exists if the jury is
instructed on a different theory of theft at trial.
In State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that a fatal
variance can exist if the instructions to the jury do not match the allegation in the charging
document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged.
Id. at 342. Such is the case here.

The allegations in the Information did not match the

instructions to the jury as to the means by which Mr. McCoy was alleged to have committed
grand theft. The variance between the charging document and the jury instructions was fatal.
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E.

The Variance Between The Information And The Jury Instructions Constituted
Fundamental Error
Because Mr. McCoy did not raise this issue in the district court, he must establish that the

variance constituted fundamental error. See Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 472-73, Perry, 150 Idaho at
228. Mr. McCoy meets the first prong of Perry fundamental error review because it is wellestablished that a fatal variance is a due process violation, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 362 (1937), State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 790 (Ct. App. 1995), and Mr. McCoy did not
waive his right to due process.
Mr. McCoy meets the second prong of fundamental error review because the error plainly
exists without the need for additional information outside the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
The fact that defense counsel did not object to the district court’s instructions was clearly not a
strategic decision, as Mr. McCoy gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an
opportunity to convict him under a different theory of grand theft than the one charged. It would
not be a reasonable strategy for an attorney to allow his client to be convicted under an improper
theory simply for the sake of potential appellate reversal. See State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 48182 (Ct. App. 2013) (concluding defendant met second prong of fundamental error review for
fatal variance claim because the record contained no indication that he knew more about the laws
than the State or the trial court and no evidence that he was attempting to sandbag the court); see
also State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167-68 (Ct. App. 2011) (concluding mere speculation that a
defendant strategically failed to object was not sufficient to find error did not plainly exist).
Finally, Mr. McCoy meets the third prong of fundamental error review because there is a
reasonable probability that the variance affected the verdict. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The
jury found Mr. McCoy guilty of grand theft after being instructed that such theft was committed
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either by Mr. McCoy’s wrongful taking of the property or by his knowing possession of the
stolen property. (R., p.128.) There is a reasonable probability that the jury found Mr. McCoy
guilty under a wrongful taking theory based on the evidence the State presented at trial. The
State presented evidence that the owner of the vehicle did not give Mr. McCoy permission to
drive the vehicle, and Mr. McCoy admitted he took the truck because “[h]e was drawn to it.”
(Tr., p.254, L.24 – p.255, L.18; State’s Ex. 3.) Mr. McCoy’s defense was based on his intent;
specifically, that he did not have the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the truck or to
appropriate it for himself. (Tr., p.310, Ls.4-7.) The evidence of Mr. McCoy’s criminal intent
was stronger with respect to his possession of the truck in Ada County, based on his interactions
with law enforcement. Based on this evidence, there is a reasonable probability the jury found
Mr. McCoy guilty of grand theft under a wrongful taking theory, which is not the theory that was
set forth in the Information. As such, Mr. McCoy meets the third prong of fundamental error
review, and his conviction should be vacated on account of the variance between the Information
and the jury instructions.

CONCLUSION
Mr. McCoy respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand theft, and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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